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INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRICE EFFECTS
OF LAND USE CONTROLS
SUSAN M. WACHTER, Ph.D. *
MAN CHO, Ph.D.**
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade can be viewed as a time of reduced regulatory con-
trol of economic activities by the United States federal government.
Examples can be found in the airline and trucking industries. In the
local land use regulations area, however, there has been a substantial
increase in the level of control and in the number of regulatory mecha-
nisms adopted by local governments. The conventional types of land
use regulations are zoning, subdivision controls, and building codes.
Local governments throughout the United States have used these types
of regulations since the early 1920s. During the 1970s and 1980s, local
jurisdictions have invented newer forms of regulation, such as growth
management plans and impact fees, in order to cope with rapidly
changing demographic and fiscal conditions.
Local land use regulations have been justified on the ground that
local governments are authorized to exercise police power to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents from negative
externalities arising from noncompatible land uses. A number of
scholars have suggested, however, that government regulations can be
viewed as the result of competition among interest groups for favorable
government action as well as a mechanism for correcting the allocative
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inefficiencies of market failure.1
Winners in local land use regulation are existing resident homeown-
ers, while losers are such groups as prospective residents,2 current rent-
ers, and land developers in the local community.3 In suburban
communities which have adopted restrictive land use controls, existing
resident homeowners are invariably the politically dominant group.4
The existing residents can benefit from excluding prospective low-in-
come residents because their contribution to local taxes is likely to be
less than their share of local services consumed.5
Existing residential property owners may also benefit from restric-
tive local land use controls through a direct price effect.6 Restrictions
may reduce the potential supply of housing, thus raising the price of
housing in the community and the cost to prospective residents.
The theoretical literature on land use controls demonstrates that
such controls have no impact on the price of a standard unit of housing
in an open city. Under this model, new housing supplied in undevel-
oped rural areas is a perfect substitute for housing in regulated close-in
suburbs. Thus, individual localities are perfect competitors in the sup-
ply of housing services, and local land use policies impact the price of
housing only through amenity effects. On the other hand, in a closed-
city model, coalitions of homeowners within and across communities
1. The seminal paper for this argument is Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). A more formalized model is presented in Peltzman,
Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976).
2. The losing prospective residents are those who wish to reside in a particular com-
munity, but who are unable to actually choose that community as their residence due to
affordability constraints.
3. Land developers (and/or the suppliers) of residential and other types of proper-
ties may or may not be affected by local land use regulations because they can transfer
some or most of the costs imposed by the regulations to final consumers, depending
upon market conditions (specifically, the price elasticity of demand).
4. See Rolleston, Determinants of Restrictive Suburban Zoning: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 21 J. LAw & ECON. 211 (1976).
5. See Bradford & Kelejian, An Econometric Model of the Flight to the Suburbs, 81
J. POL. ECON. 566 (1973). This article shows that fiscal advantages are significant in
explaining interjurisdictional mobility. Only if lump sum taxes (equal to the capitalized
value of the differential costs imposed by low-income users) can be exacted is there no
incentive to zone out low-income households. See also Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expeditures, 64 J. PoL. ECON. 416 (1956).
6. If households wish to move to another house in their current community, a rise
in their original property's value is counter-balanced by an increase in the cost of rent of
their new home. Only if they move to an alternate community does the gain in house
value increase their net worth.
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can raise housing prices through artificially restricting supply levels.
The values of land sites zoned for a given housing density are increased
by restrictive zoning.7
Empirical economic literature has focused on the externality effects
of land use controls. However, if the open-city model does not hold,
regulations may have monopoly price effects as well. This Article ex-
amines whether the increasing price of developable land sites contrib-
utes to regionally based housing affordability problems.
II. MEASURING PRICE EFFECTS OF LAND USE CONTROLS
The price effects of local land use regulations are usually measured
in hedonic housing price models. The following is a typical testing
model:
Method One: V, = f (Z, Xj, R,, T,)
where:
V,, is the value of the jth residential property located in commu-
nity i;
Zj is a vector of structural characteristics of the property in com-
munity i;
X, is a vector of locational characteristics of community i;
T, is a vector of time dummies or factors which vary with time;
R, is a vector of regulatory variables which measure the restric-
tiveness of land use controls for property j in community i.
The specific techniques used in implementing this regulatory impact
test may affect the results obtained. If the effects of regulations are
measured by including land use classifications directly in the hedonic
equation, along with attributes mandated by regulation or their com-
plements, only the attributes may appear to be significant.8
An alternative method has two steps. First, construct a housing
price index for a standard house within or across communities (using
an hedonic or a repeat sales index or a combination of both).9 Second,
test for the impact of land use controls along with other community
and time variant determinants of housing values. Under this approach:
Method Two: V, = f (Zi, X, R,, T,)
7. This increase is an addition to amenity effects.
8. For a critical review of the literature, see Pogodzinski & Sass, The Economic
Theory of Zoning: A Critical View, 66 LAND ECON. 294 (1990).
9. See Case, Pollakowski, Quigley & Wachter On Choosing Among House Price In-
dex Methodologies (prepared for the ASSA meetings Dec. 1990) for a description of
each of these approaches.
19911
Washington University Open Scholarship
52 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 40:49
where:
V is the value of the price index of units with unchanged or a set
of standard characteristics Z, and Ri is a vector of measures of
the restrictiveness of land use controls in community i.
The impact of both zoning and growth controls can be tested using this
methodology.
In developing the variables to measure the restrictiveness of controls,
two approaches may be adopted. The first approach is to use the pro-
portion of land zoned for each use and density category in a commu-
nity as a separate regulatory variable. The second approach is to
develop a restrictiveness index for land-use controls as follows:
Ri = j = 1 uWj /L,
where:
R, is the restrictiveness index in community i;
are exogenously given weights for the jth use or density
category;
Ly is the total land area zoned for thejth use or density category
in community i.
In developing these weights, more restrictive use and density categories
(such as residential-single-family and one acre minimum-lot-size re-
quirements) are assigned higher weights than more permissive use and
density categories (such as multi-family and one-quarter acre mini-
mum-lot-size requirements).10
Under the second approach, an index represents the restrictiveness
of a community with respect to multiple categories of use and density
controls. The number of regulatory variables developed under the first
approach equals the number of use and density zoning categories in the
community. The index approach requires fewer degrees of freedom
than the first approach, and thus can be used in a price index equation
which generally will have many fewer observations than a price
equation.
Land use regulations have increasingly taken the form of growth
controls. Testing for the impact of growth controls on housing prices
is usually done by comparing price appreciation in communities with
and without growth controls. Empirical studies generally find that
housing prices in communities with growth restrictions are higher than
10. For examples of this approach in developing testing variables, see Rolleston,
Determinants of Restrictive Suburban Zoning: An Empirical Analysis, 21 J. URB. ECON.
1 (1987); Shlay & Rossi, Keeping Up the Neighborhood: Estimating Net Effects of Zon-
ing, 46 AM. Soc. Rav. 703 (1981).
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those of communities with no growth controls.11 However, the testing
variables which are traditionally included in growth control studies, as
well as those included in studies of land use controls more generally,
cannot determine how these regulations may raise housing prices.
III. THE SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF LAND USE CONTROLS
Land use controls in a community positively impact local housing
prices in two scenarios. In the first scenario, controls create a better
environment, which is capitalized in higher housing prices. In the sec-
ond, growth or land use restrictions set the housing supply below equi-
librium level. Consequently, these restrictions create excess demand in
the local housing market. In the latter case, land use controls will have
inteIjurisdictional as well as intrajurisdictional effects on housing
prices.
Figures l.A., l.B., and 1.C 2 illustrate the scarcity, amenity, and
interjurisdictional effects of land use regulations. In each graph, the
units of housing supplied in the community in the current period are
measured as H on the horizontal axis, with the price of housing P,
11. See Elliott, The Impact of Growth Control Regulation on Housing Prices in Cali-
fornia, 9 AM. REAL EST. & URB. EcoN. J. 115 (1981); Katz & Rosen, TheInterurisdic-
tional Effects of Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J. LAW & ECON. 149 (1987);
Schwartz, Hansen & Green, Research Design Issues and Pitfalls in Growth Control Stud-
ies, 62 LAND EON. 223 (1986); Schwartz, Hansen & Green, The Effect of Growth Con-
trol on the Production of Moderate-Priced Housing, 60 LAND ECON. 110 (1984);
Schwartz, Hansen & Green, Suburban Growth Controls and the Price of New Housing, 8
1. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 303 (1981); Schwartz & Zorn, A Critique of Quasiexperi-
mental and Statistical Controls for Measuring Program Effects: Application to Urban
Growth Control, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 491 (1988); Zorn, Hansen &
Schwartz, Mitigating the Price Effects of Growth Control. A Case Study of Davis, Cali-
fornia, 62 LAND ECON. 46 (1986).
12. See infra notes 13-15 for graphs.
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measured on the vertical axis. In Figure I.A.13 the intersection of sup-
ply curve, S, and demand curve, D, yield the equilibrium price, P, in
community i. A higher level of restrictiveness increases amenities and
the demand for housing in the community. This shifts demand
upwards to D' and raises the equilibrium price of a house with a given
set of structural characteristics to P'.
13. LA.
Price of D 1
Housing D D S
p...........S
P . ........ ... ...1 -- ----
Intrajurisdictional Amenity Effect
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In Figure I.B. 4 the initial equilibrium price and quantity of housing
is the same as in Figure I.A. A higher level of restrictiveness shifts the
supply curve to S1, resulting in a higher equilibrium price, p. The
increased restrictiveness may result from the tightening of a variety of
controls. For example, a community may implement a growth man-
agement plan which grants fewer building permits or a new master
plan which decreases the percentage of land zoned for one acre lot size
residential use and increases the proportion zoned for agricultural use.
Fewer households are housed in community i as a result of lower sup-
ply and the higher prices of residential building sites.
This creates spillover effects to neighboring communities which are
more affordable. The interjurisdictional effects are shown in Figure
14. I.B.
Price of 1
Housing D S S
p 1  .......
p ....... .
Intrajurisdictional Scarcity Effect
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I.C. as an increase in demand from D to D' and price from P to P1 in
communityj, which is adjacent to community i and has less restrictive
land use controls.
IV. MEASURING INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRICE EFFECTS OF LAND
USE CONTROLS
A testing model can separately identify the existence of interjuridica-
tional and intrajurisdictional price effects of land use controls. In their
study, Dr. Pollakowski and Dr. Wachter constructed a simple testing
variable to identify interjurisdictional price effects.16 If these price ef-
fects exist, they signal the presence of scarcity zoning effects in addition
15. I.C.
Price of 1
Housing D S
Py
Hi
Interjurisdictional Scarcity Effect
16. Pollakowski & Wachter, The Effects of Land Use Constraints on Housing Prices,
66 LAND ECON. 315 (1990). The initial results of this research were presented at a
conference at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, co-chaired by William Fischel and
Michelle White, in the fall of 1989. The research is part of a larger project on regional
housing prices which includes the study of Fairfax County presented below supported
by the Homer Hoyt Institute.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/4
INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRICE EFFECTS
to externality effects."7 The results of this study on housing price ap-
preciation in Montgomery County, Maryland, and a more recent study
by Dr. Cho"8 from Fairfax County, Virginia, provide evidence of both
effects. These studies use data from 1982 through 1989 for suburban
counties contiguous to Washington, D.C. As exemplified in the whole
of the northeastern United States, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area experienced considerable growth in the 1980s. This growth oc-
curred both in numbers of housing starts and in housing price appreci-
ation. The results, however, may not hold for time periods and
markets with less growth.
In addition, the results may be influenced by the location of the two
communities. Other studies suggest that scarcity zoning effects would
be largest where one jurisdiction controls the area's housing market.
More generally, any price effects should be positively related to the
fraction of metropolitan land individual jurisdictions controlled.
Washington, D.C. is unusual among large American metropolitan ar-
eas in that it has relatively few governments. Consequently, the atypi-
cal level of centralization may make the results less than universal.' 9
A. Montgomery County, Maryland
Using a double sales index, Dr. Pollakowski and Dr. Wachter2 ° con-
structed longitudinal housing price indexes for seventeen planning a-
reas and groupings of planning areas that constitute Montgomery
County, Maryland. They explained these price indexes in terms of a
set of determinants which include land use restrictions.2 ' As shown in
17. If supply restrictions raise prices in neighboring communities, prices are also
increased due, at least in part, to this effect in the community implementing these
controls.
18. For the development of a model to test for interjurisdictional affordability ef-
fects, data sources, equation specifications and additional empirical estimations, see M.
Cho, The Exclusionary and Spillover Effect of Land Use Regulations: A Model and Em-
pirical Evidence (1990) (Dissertation in Public Policy and Management, The Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania). This research was supported by the Homer Hoyt
Institute and the National Association of Home Builders.
19. See Fischel, Is Local Government Structure in Large Urbanized Areas Monopo-
listic or Competitive?, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 95 (1981); Fischel, Zoning and the Exercise of
Monopoly Power: A Reevaluation, 8 J. URB. ECON. 283 (1980).
20. See Pollakowski & Wachter, supra note 16.
21. Statistical results are summarized in Tables I and II, infra notes 22 & 23.
1991]
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Table I,22 a number of national and regional variables have explanatory
power in the determination of housing price appreciation in the county.
Moreover, this study confirms the explanatory power of national mort-
gage interest rates and regional construction costs on housing demand
and, therefore, on housing prices. The study focuses, however, on local
determinants of housing prices.
A number of demand and supply factors are important at the local
level. On the demand side, the study indicates that per capita income
Montgomery County
TABLE I
Ordinary Least Sauares Estimation
Dependent Variable: Real Housing Price Index
Independent Estimated Standard
Variable Coefficient Error t-Statistic
Constant 9
Real Per Capita Income
Distance to Federal Triangle -1
Gravity Employment Index
Real Mortgage Rate
Real Construction Cost Index
Percent Land Vacant
Development Ceiling
Zoning Restrictiveness Index for Vacant and
Developed Land
Relative Restrictiveness of Adjacent Planning
Areas 8
Number of Observations
R2
Corrected 2
Sum of Squared Residuals
Standard Error of the Regression
Mean of Dependent Variable
5.462 2.876
3.765 0.671
7.008 3.773
1.085-003 1.311-
3.745 2.065
4.634+002 3.006-
0.925 0.814
3.419 2.277-
5.737 1.031
5.502 23.889
+002
-003
+002
-003
0.93
0.93
2.19+002
0.75
2.43
0.33
5.60
-4.52
0.82
-1.81
1.54
-1.13
-1.50
5.56
3.57
22.
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is an important determinant of housing prices.2 3 Per capita income is
traditionally used as a proxy for a variety of neighborhood amenities
because it is generally accepted that prices will be bid up in the neigh-
borhoods and communities with the highest levels of amenities overall.
Two measures of accessibility to employment and other destinations
of interest are included. Distance to the largest concentration of em-
ployment in the Central City (the Federal Triangle) has a significant
negative effect on housing prices, with a response elasticity of -0.240.
Another index, a gravity index of accessibility to employment within
the county, has a positive but insignificant effect. The gravity index is
correlated with the distance variable where part of the employment
effect is captured by distance.
On the supply side, the percentage of vacant land, along with land
use constraints and other growth controls, vary across planning areas.
The study finds higher housing prices where there is a limited availabil-
ity of potential residential land sites as measured by percent of land
vacant - though the coefficient is not significant.
The critical focus of the study is on the housing price effects of local
land use controls. Restrictions raise the price of existing housing,
while lowering the price of undeveloped land. As noted previously, the
increased price of existing housing may occur for either or both of two
reasons. First, the restriction of housing supply exerts an upward pres-
sure on price. Second, these low-density measures may make the af-
fected locations more desirable, thus leading to an increase in demand
and consequent increase in price. Restrictive zoning lowers prices of
undeveloped land because some desired uses of the land have been
precluded.
The Montgomery County study estimates both the direct and spil-
lover effects of zoning controls and other growth restrictions on hous-
23. Montgomery County
TABLE II
Variable Price Elasticity
Real Per Capita Income .492
Distance to Federal Triangle -. 240
Gravity Employment Index .008
Real Mortgage Rate -. 028
Real Construction Cost Index .346
Percent Land Vacant -. 024
Development Ceiling -. 013
Zoning Restrictiveness Index .275
Relative Restrictiveness of Adjacent Planning Areas .093
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
60 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 40:49
ing prices. The direct effects of regulatory cpntrol are calculated first
through measures of allowed residential development ceilings estab-
lished by the Montgomery County Planning Board for each area. A
second index of regulatory controls measures the restrictiveness of zon-
ing. Residentially developed and vacant land is ordered by lot size and
intended use, and the index is constructed as a weighted sum of the
percentage of land zoned at varying degrees of restrictiveness. Spill-
over effects are identified by constructing measures of the relative re-
strictiveness of adjacent planning area regulations for each of the above
variables.
The study finds that the effects of local development ceilings are, in
the aggregate, quite small. This resuli is perhaps not surprising, given
that this constraint is clearly not binding in many cases. Zoning re-
strictiveness is found to have a significant positive effect on housing
prices, obtaining a housing price elasticity of 0.275. A spillover effect
of restrictiveness of neighboring areas is also separately identified with
a housing price response elasticity of 0.093.
These findings show that specific local growth controls may have
both interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional effects. Thus, restrictive
zoning in one jurisdiction (or neighborhood) can contribute to housing
price appreciation in adjacent areas. While the magnitude of this effect
is smaller than the intrajurisdictional effect, it is nonetheless significant.
B. Fairfax County, Virginia
The Montgomery County study methodology has been extended to
Fairfax County, Virginia.24 The data derive from Fairfax County Real
Estate Assessment Data tapes which the Tax Assessment Office col-
lects and the Office of Research and Statistics of the Fairfax County
Government organizes. The data consist of transaction prices and
structural characteristics for all properties within the county. Using
hedonics, housing price indexes are estimated for ten magistral districts
within the county and explanatory equations are estimated. The re-
gression specification is similar to that for Montgomery County, as are
24. See M. Cho, supra note 18 (development of a model to test for interjurisdic-
tional affordability effects, data sources, equation specifications and additional empirical
estimations).
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the results shown in Table Ill.25 The dependent variable is the log of
the hedonic real price index.
The distance variable has a negative coefficient, as expected, and is
significant. The result shows that housing prices decreased by 2.45%
for each mile farther from the city center of Washington, D.C. The
coefficient of household income is positive, as expected, and is signifi-
cant. The coefficient of the income variable shows that a $1000 in-
crease in household income raises housing prices by 2.29%. The
coefficient of vacant land is negative, as expected, but it is not
significant.
There are some differences in the specification for Fairfax relative to
the Montgomery County equation: a change in housing prices is in-
cluded to identify disequilibrium effects but it is not significant. The
regulatory variables are measured as described above except that in-
dexes are created for vacant land only and population density is in-
cluded. The negative sign of the latter is interpreted as measuring
disamenities associated with crowding. There are additional regulatory
variables included. Apart from the index of the proportion of residen-
tial relative to commercial land use designated in each magistral dis-
25. TABLE III
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent Variable: Real Housing Price Index (Log)
Independent Estimated Standard
Variable Coefficient Error t-Statistic
Constant
Real Per Capita Income
Distance to Federal Triangle
Change of Real Housing Price Index over two years
(Log)
Population Density
Percent Land Vacant
Zoning Restrictiveness Index for Vacant Land
Relative Zoning Restrictiveness of Adjacent Plan-
ning Areas
Use Restrictiveness Index for Vacant Land
Relative Use Restrictiveness of Adjacent Planning
Areas
Number of Observations
R2
Corrected R'
Sum of Squared Residuals
Standard Error of the Regression
Mean of Dependent Variable
10.840
0.023
-0.035
0.007
-0.071
-0.006
0.012
0.003
-0.085
0.412
0.003
0.010
0.006
0.023
0.003
0.004
0.001
0.021
0.025 0.005
0.84
0.79
0.49
0.009
11.86
26.28
7.00
-3.53
1.17
-3.11
-1.69
2.81
2.68
-3.98
4.94
19911
Washington University Open Scholarship
62 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 40:49
trict's vacant land, however, none is significant. The latter has the
expected negative sign indicating that the higher the percentage of land
allocated to residential use, the lower are housing prices.26
In Fairfax, as in Montgomery, spillover variables are included to
measure the relative restrictiveness of adjacent planning area regula-
tions on housing prices. The coefficients of the spillover variables are
significant with the expected positive sign.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The implementation of restrictive land use controls raise several
public policy concerns. One is the spatial distribution of the per capita
tax costs and quality of local public goods across metropolitan areas,
most importantly, education. In urban areas which do not adopt ex-
clusionary controls, the diminished tax base may cause costs to rise
relative to those in restrictive suburban communities. A second con-
cern is access to affordable housing.27 Issues of inefficiencies resulting
from the deconcentration of urban areas also exist. Land use controls
may accelerate this process by increasing the pressure on environmen-
tal resources in the rural fringe and producing diseconomies of scale in
the provision of infrastructure, especially transportation. Although
planners and policy makers regard all of these with concern, state
courts have focused mostly on the former. Nonetheless, the issues are
interrelated. If the open-city model holds in its extreme version, then
new communities will develop to deliver housing and public goods to
residents at no extra cost in response to existing communities adopting
restrictive regulations. Land use controls limit free rider effects with-
out raising housing costs to nonresidents. Individuals who choose
communities which provide relatively large amounts of amenities pay
for it with their property taxes as they are constrained to consume ap-
propriately large amounts of housing. Nonetheless, they have a choice
of less expensive communities with fewer amenities. Additionally,
26. Pollakowski & Wachter also use regulatory indexes for vacant land only, with
similar results. The competitive demand for commercial land use is measured with the
gravity employment index based upon data gathered in Montgomery County but not for
Fairfax.
27. There has been little testing for the impact of affordability constraints on loca-
tion or other housing decisions. See Linneman & Wachter, The Impacts of Borrowing
Constraints on Homeownership, 17 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. 389 (1989) for an
empirical estimate of the impact of affordability constraints on the rent or own
decisions.
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there are no affordability effects because the choice of cheaper housing
remains.
Alternatively, the exclusion of potential residents through the adop-
tion of land use controls in some communities may raise the cost of
housing in neighboring communities. Spillover effects occur if the
housing supply is not infinitely elastic and if housing in newly devel-
oped communities does not perfectly substitute for that in existing
communities. As a result, the open-city model does not hold. If so,
land use controls will increase the price of housing in both the commu-
nity adopting the controls and its neighbors.
Implementation of land use controls in this case limits the develop-
ment of close-in suburbs below market equilibrium levels and acceler-
ates the growth of rural areas on the urban fringe. If productivity
depends upon the spatial distribution of the population due to agglom-
eration effects, economies of scale in infrastructure distribution, and
environmental effects, then this development may be suboptimal for
the region as a whole, even though it is optimal for individual
communities.28
Effectively, the community that adopts restrictive controls will have
an impact on the price of housing and the pace of development in adja-
cent communities. The existence of interjurisdictional price effects im-
plies that controls have positive effects on housing prices separate from
those attributable to improved amenities. Thus, controls may affect the
affordability of housing due to scarcity zoning and amenity effects.
The empirical tests for interjurisdictional effects suggest that this
may occur for the period and communities to which the tests have been
applied. More research is needed on whether those results can be ex-
tended to longer time frames and other geographical areas. In addi-
tion, the implications of the research are limited. Land use controls
have benefits. That they have costs to residents of adjacent communi-
ties does not imply that, on balance, their use negatively affects the
public good.
28. For an analysis of the efficiency of local zoning and taxation, see Fischel, Does
Fiscal Zoning Make the Property Tax Efficient? (prepared for the ASSA meetings Dec.
1990)
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